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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall ruled that bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts of Article III courts, do not have the constitutional authority to enter final judgments on state law counterclaims
1
in bankruptcy proceedings. In doing so, the Court appeared to be
diverging from its most recent precedent, which recognized a more
expansive Congressional authority to establish non-Article III adjudicatory bodies, and reverting back to the more restrictive, public
rights/private rights dichotomy in determining the constitutionality
of non-Article III tribunals. This Comment seeks to explore this gap
in legal scholarship, and argues that the holding in Stern has forced
administrative agencies and legislative courts to occupy a position of
uncertainty as to their constitutionality within the Supreme Court’s
Article III analysis. Before delving into the doctrinal inconsistencies
of Stern and its potential implications on non-Article III adjudicatory
bodies, this Comment will address the key points in the Supreme
Court’s precedent that are relevant to the discussion.
Article III of the United States Constitution requires the judicial
power of the United States to “be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
2
and establish.” Furthermore, it specifies that “[t]he judicial power
shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti3
tution, the Laws of the United States . . . .” The Framers of the Constitution believed this was not only necessary to preserve the inde∗
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pendence of the judiciary from encroachment by other branches of
4
the government, but also necessary to preserve individual liberty.
Over time, the Supreme Court began to recognize limited exceptions
in which it would be constitutionally permissible to substitute Article I
tribunals for Article III courts. Based on its rulings in prior deci5
sions, the Court articulated three categories of valid, non-Article III
adjudicatory authority in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.: territorial courts, military tribunals, and matters involv6
ing public rights.
This Comment will focus primarily on the development of the
public rights doctrine, its growth, abandonment, and revival following the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall. Stern has garnered much attention over the past three years due to its lack of clarity in specifying the parameters of Article III and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine. While many legal scholars have examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern for bankruptcy
courts and their authority to preside over claims arising out of bankruptcy proceedings, very few have analyzed Stern’s implications outside of the bankruptcy context—specifically, the legitimacy of admin7
istrative agencies and other legislative courts in the post-Stern era.
This Comment examines the implications of Stern on the authority
of non-Article III adjudicatory bodies. In particular, it will examine
Congress’s delegation of Article I authority to magistrate judges under the Federal Magistrates Act as well as the Act’s constitutionality
under the majority’s reasoning in Stern. While some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern signifies the Court’s
return to a more formalistic approach, this Comment argues that the
Court, in attempting to reconcile Stern with its earlier decisions in
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that
separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident
that each department should have a will of its own . . . .”).
See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (recognizing Congress’s authority
to establish non-Article III military courts); Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (upholding the constitutionality of legislative courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving
“public rights”); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (acknowledging Congress’s authority to create non-Article III territorial courts).
458 U.S. 50, 66–67 (1982).
See, e.g., Joshua D. Talicska, Jurisdictional Game Changer or Narrow Holding? Discussing the
Potential Effects of Stern v. Marshall and Offering a Roadmap through the Milieu, 9 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 31, 42–43 (2012) (interpreting Stern within the context of the history of bankruptcy system in the United States).
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8

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. and Commodity Futures
9
Trading Commission v. Schor, occupies a precarious position between
formalism and functionalism that is both confusing and doctrinally
inconsistent. One of the implications of this inconsistency is that it
places non-Article III tribunals in a constitutional limbo that, without
clarification from the Supreme Court, may raise serious questions
about their constitutionality post-Stern.
Part I of this Comment examines the evolution of the Public
Rights Doctrine as well as the gradual expansion of non-Article III
tribunals leading up to Stern v. Marshall. Part II analyzes the doctrinal
inconsistencies in the Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall, and Part III
discusses the potential implications of Stern in the context of magistrate judges.
I. LEGISLATIVE COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. The Rise of the Public Rights Doctrine
The Supreme Court established the notion of “public rights” for
10
the first time in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. In
Murray’s Lessee, the Court acknowledged that while Congress may not
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of the suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty[,]” there may be matters involving public rights “which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
11
the United States.”
Nearly four decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the public
rights exception in Crowell v. Benson, which upheld a federal employee compensation program under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
12
Worker’s Compensation Act.
In Crowell, the Court distinguished
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473 U.S. 568 (1985).
478 U.S. 833 (1986)
59 U.S. at 272. In Murray’s Lessee, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
Department of Treasury, pursuant to a federal statute, can deprive an individual of his
property without the exercise of judicial power of the United States.
Id. at 284.
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Prior to the Longshoremen’s Act, there were other federal regulatory schemes in place, including the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which engaged in policy-making, ruleformulation, enforcement tasks and adjudication. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 238 (1990).
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public rights, which “arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the consti13
tutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,” from
private rights, which involve “the liability of one individual to another
14
under the law as defined.” The Court found that the federal worker’s compensation scheme clearly fell within the purview of the public rights exception because “[b]y the Longshoremen’s Act, Congress
created fact-finding and fact-gathering tribunals, supplementing the
courts and entrusted with the power to make initial determinations in
15
matters within, and not outside, ordinary judicial purview.”
The Court in Crowell appeared to align its holding to traditional
conceptions of the Public Rights Doctrine. But in reality, the Court
had proposed a novel idea in upholding the constitutionality of the
Longshoremen’s Act. According to Professor James E. Pfander, “the
early history of public rights exception did not support granting
Congress broad authority to substitute Article I tribunals for Article
16
III courts.” In fact, whereas the Court in Murray’s Lessee “upheld
Congress’s power . . . to transform the common law action against the
executive officer into one against the government itself . . . it did not
suggest that such an action might be assigned to an Article I tribu17
nal.” In contrast, the Court in Crowell justified upholding the Longshoremen’s Act on the ground that the purpose of the federal worker’s compensation board was “to withdraw from the courts, subject to
the power of judicial review, a class of controversy which experience
has shown can be more effectively and expeditiously handled in the
18
first instance by a special and expert tribunal.” The Court’s decision
in Crowell was significant in that it not only defined but also considerably expanded the Public Rights Doctrine first articulated by the
Court in Murray’s Lessee, which provided the foundation for Congress
to institute a vast and wide range of legislative and administrative
19
bodies throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
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285 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 88.
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 760 (2004).
Id.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 88.
See Bator, supra note 12 at 238–39 (concluding that the Court’s decision in Crowell has
served as “an enriching source of important institutional flexibility and innovation” that
has enabled Congress to establish a wide variety of adjudicative institutions “dealing with
one or many subject matters and administering a huge variety of statutory schemes
through a huge variety of processes”).
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B. The Expansion of the Public Rights Doctrine and the Adoption of Schor’s
Balancing Approach
Following in the footsteps of Crowell, the Supreme Court’s two
most recent cases leading up to its decision in Stern v. Marshall appeared to signal a trend towards validating expansive, non-Article III
adjudicatory authority. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), which
required private parties to arbitrate disputes about cost-sharing in
20
connection with the registration of pesticides under the Act. Based
on the Court’s reasoning in Crowell, FIFRA most likely would have exceeded the boundaries of the Public Rights Doctrine since the case
21
concerned a dispute between two private parties. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the mandatory and binding arbitration scheme under FIFRA does not violate Article III and separation of powers because the right to compensation under the Act arises under FIFRA
and “does not depend on or replace a right to such compensation
22
under state law.”
By upholding the constitutionality of FIFRA and its mandatory arbitration scheme, the Court in Thomas effectively expanded the Public Rights Doctrine to encompass matters involving two private parties
that arise, at a minimum, from a federal statutory scheme. The
Court, however, went one step further in Thomas and rejected the
public rights/private rights dichotomy as not determinative in Article
23
III analysis. From the Court’s perspective a proper interpretation of
Article III affords the Federal Government sufficient flexibility to rely
on administrative tribunals to help carry out the proper functions of
24
the judiciary.
Following in the same trajectory, the Court in Commodity Futures
25
Trading Commission v. Schor granted Congress even greater latitude
by adopting a flexible balancing test to determine the nature and extent of the non-Article III tribunal’s intrusion into the Judicial
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473 U.S. 568, 573 (1985).
C.f. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50 (defining “public rights” as relating to matters arising between
the government and the individual subject to its authority).
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584.
Id. at 585–86
Id. at 599 (Brennan, J., concurring).
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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26

Branch. The litigation in Schor arose from a Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) regulation that enabled the CFTC to
adjudicate counterclaims, including state law counterclaims, arising
out of the same transaction as the claim at issue in the CFTC repara27
tions proceeding.
In determining whether the federal statutory
scheme violated separation of powers, the Court identified four factors for lower courts to consider in deciding on the Article III challenge: (1) “the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated”; (2) “the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts”; (3) “the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial
power’ are reserved to Article III courts”; and (4) “the concerns that
28
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.”
Here, the Court found that “the relative allocation of powers between the CFTC and Article III courts . . . demonstrates that the congressional scheme does not impermissibly intrude on the province of
29
the judiciary.” In its analysis, the Court readily acknowledged that
the state law counterclaim asserted in the CFTC proceeding was a
“private” right and “is therefore a claim of the kind assumed to be at
30
the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to Article III courts.” Despite this fact, the Court emphasized that measuring the extent of encroachment into Article III may be more accurately determined by
looking at the substance of what Congress has done as opposed to
31
simply adopting a categorical approach. According to the Court,
the private nature of a claim made the danger of encroachment on
32
judicial powers by other branches of the government more likely.
Nevertheless, this characteristic alone was not determinative in Arti26

27
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Justice Byron White proposed the application of a balancing approach in Article III analysis in his dissenting opinion in Northern Pipeline. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 114 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (citing case precedents to argue that the Court has always weighed the value of the Article I court against the values
furthered by a strict adherence to Article III).
Schor, at 837; see 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (2012) (“[The Commission is authorized] to make and
promulgate such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes
of this chapter.”); 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (2012) (“The Commission may promulgate such rules,
regulations, and orders as it deems necessary or appropriate for the efficient and expeditious administration of this section . . . [and] may prescribe, . . . without limitation . . . service of pleadings or orders, the nature and scope of discovery, counterclaims,
[or] motion practice . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Schor, 476 U.S. at 851.
Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Id.
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33

cle III analysis. Weighed against “the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency,” the CFTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over the
common law counterclaim did not violate Article III of the Constitu34
tion. Specifically, the Court noted that CFTC deals “only with a
‘particularized area of law’” as opposed to a broad grant of adjudicatory authority, and it “does not exercise ‘all ordinary powers of dis35
trict courts,’” such as presiding over jury trials.
Post-Schor, it appeared as though the Court would permit almost
any act of Congressional authority that falls short of a blatant usurpation of the authority of Article III courts. According to some scholars, Schor stands for two key propositions. First, the Court would find
“there is no great danger to structural values when Congress simply
transfers some matters from Article III courts to alternative adjudica36
tive bodies.” Even in cases where Congress grants non-Article III
tribunals the authority to preside over matters traditionally reserved
for Article III courts, Article III concerns would not automatically be
implicated under the Court’s rationale. Second, where structural
values are not at stake, Congress should be afforded great latitude
37
with respect to the creation of non-Article III courts. Based on the
Court’s reasoning it is clear that the role of the public rights doctrine
in Article III analysis is almost obsolete and the nature and extent of
the non-Article III tribunal is determined by a balancing test.
C. Stern v. Marshall and the Supreme Court’s Return to the Public Rights
Doctrine
The landscape of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up
to Stern v. Marshall seemed to suggest that the Court would grant
Congress significant leeway in its authority to create non-Article III
38
adjudicatory bodies. This, however, proved not to be the case. In
Stern, the Court addressed the issue of whether bankruptcy courts,
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 (“Act”), may enter final judgment
33

34
35
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38

See, e.g., N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 109 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the private
nature of a claim is not determinative in assessing whether the act of Congress has violated Article III).
Schor, 476 U.S. at 858, 863.
Id. at 852–53 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85).
George D. Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value—The Demise of Northern Pipeline and
its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 79 (1988).
Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine
in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 115 (1988).
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 36, at 76 (concluding that the Court did the functional equivalent of overruling Northern Pipeline by replacing the analysis with one which will always
come out in favor of the congressional choice).
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on state law counterclaims in bankruptcy proceedings. The respondent in Stern had filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the respondent’s defamation claim against the petitioner was not dis39
chargeable in the petitioner’s bankruptcy proceeding. In response
to the complaint, the petitioner had filed a state law counterclaim
against the respondent for tortious interference, for which the bank40
ruptcy court had issued judgment in favor of the petitioner.
Under Schor’s four-factor balancing test, the Supreme Court
should have upheld the bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment
41
on the petitioner’s state law counterclaim. Instead, the Court held
that the provision of the Act granting bankruptcy courts authority to
preside over all counterclaims arising from or related to the bank42
ruptcy proceeding violated Article III. The Court’s reasoning in
Stern, in many ways, baffled and troubled the lower courts as well as
legal scholars because it not only indicated a divergence from the
trend towards granting Congress greater authority in establishing
non-Article III tribunals, it also signaled a reversion back to the application of a more restrictive Article III analysis utilized by the Court in
43
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line.
Northern Pipeline, a predecessor to Thomas and Schor, was also a case
regarding the adjudicatory authority of bankruptcy courts. In Northern Pipeline, a plurality of the Court held that the bankruptcy court, as
a non-Article III tribunal, did not have constitutional authority to
render final decisions on the parties’ breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress claims even though the
44
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 authorized it to do so. Citing a long line of
precedent, the Court determined that Congress may establish nonArticle III tribunals only under three, specific instances: territorial
45
courts, military tribunals, and matters involving public rights. According to the plurality, these three, narrow exceptions did not violate Article III because “the grant of [such] power to the Legislative
and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative
39
40
41

42
43
44
45

Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011).
Id.
Cf. id. at 2624–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (determining that the application of Schor’s balancing factors weighed in favor of granting bankruptcy courts authority to adjudicate
state law counterclaims in bankruptcy proceedings).
Id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 87 (plurarity opinion).
Id. at 64–67; see also id. at 103–05 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality opinion’s
holding).
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courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitu46
tional mandate of separation of power.”
Since bankruptcy courts did not fall under the category of territorial courts or military tribunals, the Court considered whether this
exercise of legislative power fell within the public rights exception.
First, the Court noted that “a matter of public rights must at a mini47
mum arise ‘between the government and others.’” Second, while
recognizing that Congress “possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated—including
the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed by judges,” the Court concluded that it does not possess the
same degree of discretion in assigning traditionally judicial power to
adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights not created by Con48
gress. Under this framework, the Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 fell outside of the limits of the public rights doctrine because Congress had granted bankruptcy courts authority to
49
preside over matters traditionally reserved for Article III courts.
Furthermore, in invalidating the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the Court
effectively “refus[ed] to recognize a new exception to Article III,
and . . . upheld the traditional view that only Article III courts may
50
exercise the judicial power.”
The Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline, which signified a valiant
effort “to block any further erosion of the role of article III courts as
51
the adjudicative arm of the national government,” garnered much
criticism from scholars who found the analysis to be doctrinally in52
consistent. Furthermore, these scholars found the Court’s decision
to be troubling in the sense that “[r]ead broadly, Justice [William]
Brennan’s opinion cast[] doubt upon the validity of a wide range of
non-article III adjudicative mechanisms, including decision making
53
by administrative agencies.” The Court’s subsequent decisions in
Thomas and Schor, however, appeared to reaffirm the validity of nonArticle III tribunals. In Thomas, the Court “permitted resolution by
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53

Id. at 64 (plurarity opinion).
Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
Id. at 80–82.
Id. at 87.
Pfander, supra note 16, at 770.
Brown, supra note 36, at 65.
See, e.g., id. at 55 (noting that commentators were critical of the decision); Martin H.
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 199–200 (1983) (asserting that an absolute interpretation of Article III
would place heavy restrictions on the work of administrative agencies).
Brown, supra note 36, at 55.
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non-article III arbitrators of disputes which, though implicating con54
gressionally created rights, were between private parties.” Similarly,
Schor permitted a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate disputes between private parties implicating rights arising under the common
law, which “seemed to be just the sort of claim that Northern Pipeline . . . had held beyond the power of a non-article III court to adju55
dicate.” The Court in both Thomas and Schor had essentially “rejected attempts to extend Northern Pipeline and accorded Congress
56
considerable latitude in choosing adjudicative mechanisms,” and
this doctrinal inconsistency between Northern Pipeline, on the one
hand, and Thomas and Schor, on the other, led many scholars to pre57
sume that the Court had implicitly overturned Northern Pipeline.
What is significant about the holding in Northern Pipeline for the
purposes of this Comment is not so much that it is incompatible with
the Court’s subsequent decisions in Thomas and Schor, but rather that
the Court in Stern adopted and attempted to reconcile Northern Pipeline’s doctrinal framework with those of Thomas and Schor, even
though doing so created grave inconsistencies in the Court’s Article
58
III jurisprudence.
II. STERN AND THE DOCTRINAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SUPREME
COURT’S ARTICLE III ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern created a lot of confusion
among lower courts and constitutional scholars because it diverged
significantly from the Court’s decisions in Thomas and Schor; and because the Court failed to reconcile the logical and methodological
inconsistencies in its analyses, making it almost impossible for the
59
lower courts to formulate a clear, concise rule. In particular, “the
54

55
56
57
58

59

See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 37, at 111–12 (determining that Northern Pipeline would
have excluded the regulatory scheme in Thomas and would have delegitimized many of
the institutions of the modern administrative state).
Id. at 1010.
Brown, supra note 36, at 55.
Id.
Following the Court’s decision in Schor, many scholars concluded that Northern Pipeline’s
“arbitrary distinctions between the public and private and between article I courts and adjuncts” were no longer part of the Court’s analysis in deciding the constitutionality of
non-Article III adjudicatory authority. Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal
Judiical Power: From Murray’s Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 865–
66 (1986).
See Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial
Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2013)
(“Stern’s indeterminacy reflects the fact that it is difficult to make sense of its ‘holding’
and any ‘rule’ that would follow from it.”).
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Court’s broad rhetoric about the separation of powers ma[de] un60
The disparate outcomes
clear how far the opinion reache[d].”
among lower courts arising from the Court’s confusing reasoning in
Stern have forced the Court to further clarify its holding on the adju61
dicatory authority of bankruptcy courts.
While the Court’s recent efforts to better elucidate its Article III
analysis in Stern have been relatively useful, these efforts have been
limited to the context of bankruptcy courts and have not provided insight into the implications of Stern on the adjudicatory authority of
administrative agencies and other non-Article III tribunals. Furthermore, whereas there has been a wealth of legal scholarship discussing
the effects of Stern on the future of bankruptcy courts and the doctrinal inconsistencies present in the Court’s opinion, few scholars have
explored the potential implications of Stern on the legitimacy of other
administrative and legislative bodies.
A. Deconstructing the Court’s Decision in Stern
Despite the Court’s more recent decision in Schor, which rejected
the public rights/private rights categorical approach as not determinative in Article III analysis, the Court in Stern followed the plurality
decision in Northern Pipeline, which held that whether a matter may be
heard by a non-Article III tribunal without violating the Constitution
62
ultimately depends on if it falls within the “public rights” doctrine.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress may not “withdraw
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the sub63
ject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” The
Court effectively reverted back to its discourse in Murray’s Lessee in
recognizing a category of cases involving “public rights” as an exception to separation of powers concerns, including: cases dependent
upon the will of Congress whether a remedy in the courts shall be al60
61

62

63

Id. at 1189.
See, e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2168 (2014) (“The Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcyrelated claim, the relevant statute nevertheless permits a bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district
court.”); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2013) (cert.
granted) (addressing the question of whether a party may waive an Article III objection to
a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to enter final judgment in a core proceeding).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610; see Stephanie J. Bentley, Responding to Stern v. Marshall, 29 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 145, 145 (2012) (discussing the Court’s decision to readopt the categorical
approach of the public rights doctrine employed in Northern Pipeline).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.

736

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

lowed at all; those arising between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments; and
claims that derive from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essen64
tial to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.
What is interesting about the Court’s opinion in Stern is that the
Court purposefully upheld Thomas and Schor, which had unquestionably adopted a more expansive and flexible approach than Northern
Pipeline and Stern, as still being valid authority on the Court’s Article
65
III jurisprudence.
B. Criticism of Stern v. Marshall
The Supreme Court’s attempt in Stern to reconcile Northern Pipeline with Thomas and Schor has received a great deal of criticism from
66
legal scholars. Foremost, scholars have called into question the bases for the Court’s recognition of the Public Rights Doctrine in the
Article III inquiry—specifically, the Court’s seemingly arbitrary linedrawing between what the Court defines as “public rights” and all
67
other matters that fall outside of this category. In Stern, Chief Justice
John Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized at length the importance of judicial independence and the necessity of having tenured judges not only to preserve the structural principles of separa68
tion of powers but also to protect individual interests. According to
Chief Justice Roberts, Article III of the Constitution does not permit
the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on the state law counterclaims because bankruptcy judges lack “the tenure and salary

64
65

66

67

68

Id. at 2610.
See id. at 2614 (distinguishing Thomas on the grounds that the petitioner’s state law counterclaim “does not flow from a federal statutory scheme,” and distinguishing Schor on the
basis that the petitioner’s counterclaim “is not ‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication
of a claim created by federal law”).
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without A Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 183, 185 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s return to formalism is not only inconsistent with Thomas and Schor, but also highly unsuitable for interpreting Article III of the
Constitution).
See Bator, supra note 12, at 250 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s own confusing and
contradictory formulations of the “public rights” category renders it very little to no holding power).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.
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guarantees of Article III” and only Article III courts have authority to
69
preside over claims arising from the common law.
As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points out, however, Chief Justice
Roberts never actually explains why Congress may constitutionally assign to “legislative” courts for resolution cases involving “public
70
rights,” while allowing the bankruptcy judge in Stern to enter final
judgment on the state law counterclaim “compromises these goals,”
71
other than the fact that the plurality in Northern Pipeline said so. It
seems that the category of “public rights,” itself, has created much
discontent among scholars. Many find that in the modern administrative state “suffused by statutory and administrative schemes that
characteristically create complex interdependencies between public
and private enforcement, it is unintelligible and futile to try to maintain rigid distinctions between questions of private and public
72
rights.”
Furthermore, the actual structure of the Constitution appears to
support the balancing approach adopted by the Supreme Court in
73
Schor. According to Professor Paul Bator, this is largely due to the
fact that the constitutional structure is a scheme of “divided and overlapping powers in which a highly sophisticated system of checks and
balances assures that no branch has exclusive jurisdiction even within
74
its own domain.” In the alternative, even if the public rights category were an “intelligible and manageable category” as opposed to one
subjected to evolving interpretations, the category still is not “congruent with cases where the use of an article I court or administrative
75
agency is valid.”
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75

Id.; accord Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1855) (holding that Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty”).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610 (“The plurality in Northern Pipeline recognized that there was a
category of cases involving ‘public rights’ that Congress could constitutionally assign to
‘legislative’ courts for resolution.”).
Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 201, 205.
Bator, supra note 12, at 250.
See id. at 255 (“Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be
read as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. . . . The burden on Art. III values should be measured
against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Art. I courts.” (quotations
omitted)); see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 37, at 117 (“One reason why it is difficult to identify a valid historical basis for the public-private rights distinction is that there
is little, if any, support for the doctrine of legislative courts in the historical record.”).
Bator, supra note 12, at 265 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 250.
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There is a notable shift in the Court’s analysis of non-Article III
tribunals in Stern from the functional approach applied in Thomas
76
and Schor, to a more formal approach. In Schor, the Court utilized
the four-factor balancing test to determine whether the CFTC regulation violated Article III. In determining that CFTC adhered to Article III principles, the Court rejected the stringent categorical approach and, instead, looked at the nature of the matter to assess
77
whether an Article III violation had occurred. In contrast, the Court
in Stern merely looked to see whether or not the counterclaim fell
under the category of “private rights” without actually measuring the
78
extent of the supposed intrusion into the authority of the judiciary.
While some scholars have criticized the Court’s adoption of the formal approach in Stern as the cause of the inconsistency in the Court’s
79
analysis, this Comment argues that the doctrinal inconsistency actually arises from the Court’s attempt to utilize both the functional and
formal approaches in its Article III analysis.
The Court in Stern held that the bankruptcy court’s entry of final
judgment on the state law counterclaim violated Article III of the
Constitution. In response to the dissenting Justices’ argument that
Congress’s delegation of authority to the bankruptcy court in the particular instance posed minimal threat to encroaching upon the au80
thority of the judiciary, Justice Roberts, writing for the majority stated that “[a] statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of
81
the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely.” Looking at
this quotation, alone, suggests the Court has overruled Thomas and
Schor. Moreover, had the Court overruled these two cases, either implicitly or explicitly, it would have been easier for the lower courts
and legal scholars to deduce a bright-line rule from the Court’s opin-
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See Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 184 (“The only way to understand Stern v. Marshall is to
see it as a very formalistic application of legal rules . . . .”); John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1941 (2011) (“Functionalist decisions presuppose that Congress has plenary authority to compose the government under
the Necessary and Proper Clause, subject only to the requirement that a particular governmental scheme maintain a proper overall balance of power. Formalist opinions, in
contrast, assume that the constitutional structure adopts a norm of strict separation which
may sharply limit presumptive congressional power to structure the government.”).
Schor, 478 U.S. at 855.
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 62, at 192 (concluding that the Stern decision declined to give
much guidance on identifying “permissible public rights actions”); Chemerinsky, supra
note 66, at 206–08 (explaining that the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stern has “immediately caused enormous litigation as to its scope and application.”).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2620 (majority opinion).
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ion. The inconsistency arises, however, because the majority effectively upheld its decisions in Thomas and Schor, which are both in82
compatible with the Court’s formalistic approach in Stern. As Professor Chemerinsky suggests, the Court could have “recognized and
disavowed the functional approach of Thomas and Schor . . . . Or it
could have embraced the functional approach of Thomas and Schor
and acknowledged that they had replaced the formalism of Northern
83
Pipeline.”
Instead, the Court attempts to distinguish Stern from
Thomas and Schor even though under the Court’s reasoning, the federal statutory schemes in both Thomas and Schor would be declared
unconstitutional.
III. THE STATUS OF NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS POST-STERN
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern raises a lot of questions
about the constitutionality of administrative agencies and other legislative courts. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has explicitly
upheld its decisions in Thomas and Schor, despite the doctrinal incon84
sistency. Moreover, the Court has also stated that “[g]iven the extent to which this case is so markedly distinct from the agency cases
discussing the public rights exception in the context of such a regime . . . we do not in this opinion express any view on how the doc85
trine might apply in that different context.”
The lack of clarity
leaves numerous non-Article III adjudicatory bodies in a precarious
position in regards to their constitutionality. Without more information from the Supreme Court, the lower courts are simply left with
an incoherent doctrine that may or may not be interpreted broadly to
invalidate a large proportion of congressionally created non-Article
III adjudicatory institutions.
A. Federal Magistrates Act
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall and its readoption of the more restrictive public rights analysis set forth in
Northern Pipeline raises particular concerns regarding the validity of
magistrate judges in the federal judiciary. Established by Congress
under the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, magistrate judges have the

82
83
84
85

See Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 203 (“It is not possible to reconcile the functional approach in Thomas and Schor with the formalistic approach in Stern v. Marshall.”).
Id. at 203–04.
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615.
Id.

740

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

authority to carry out a number of responsibilities, which include
“hear[ing] and determin[ing] any pretrial matter pending before the
86
court,” and the power “to enter a sentence for a class A misdemean87
or in a case in which the parties have consented.” Moreover, section
636(c)(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act states:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate
judge or a part-time United States magistrate judge who serves as a fulltime officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he
88
serves.

Put more simply, when the parties consent to having their case proceed before the magistrate judge, the magistrate judge has the authority to exercise jurisdiction and to “direct the entry of a judgment
of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro89
cedure.” If an aggrieved party chooses to appeal the decision of the
magistrate judge, the party “may appeal directly to the appropriate
United States court of appeals . . . in the same manner as an appeal
90
from any other judgment of the district court.”
While the Federal Magistrates Act entrusts magistrate judges with
significant authority to adjudicate and preside over civil and criminal
proceedings in federal district court, magistrate judges do not possess
Article III adjudicatory authority. In fact, magistrate judges are appointed to eight-year terms by the district court judges in each United
States district—similar to the way bankruptcy judges are appointed to
91
fourteen-year terms. Despite the fact that magistrate judges do not
have tenure or salary protection, they have authority to preside over
both criminal and civil proceedings, and even enter final judgment in
civil cases with the parties’ consent, including state law counterclaims.
Under the rationale put forth by Chief Justice Roberts in Stern,
which invalidated key provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the Court
92
may also find the Federal Magistrates Act unconstitutional. Magistrate judges have the authority to preside over both criminal and civil
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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. § 636(a)(5).
Id. § 636(c)(1).
Id. § 636(c)(3).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (e).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[F]unctionally, bankruptcy judges
can be compared to magistrate judges, law clerks, and the Judiciary’s administrative officials, whose lack of Article III tenure and compensation protections do not endanger the
independence of the Judicial Branch.” (emphasis added)).
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proceedings; they have the authority to adjudicate matters between
private parties that involve private rights; and they have the authority
to preside over jury trials and enter final judgment on state law claims
with the parties’ consent. More importantly, magistrate judges do
not have lifetime appointment, and Chief Justice Roberts specifically
emphasized in Stern that “the tenure and salary guarantees of Article
III” are crucial to preserving the independence of the judiciary and
93
to protecting individual interests.
In United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 636(b) of the Magistrates Act, which “authorizes
a district court to refer such a motion to a magistrate and thereafter
to determine and decide such motion based on the record developed
before the magistrate, including the magistrate’s proposed findings
94
of fact and recommendations.” The criminal defendant in Raddatz
appealed the district court’s finding of guilt on the ground “that the
review procedures established by section 636(b)(1) permitting the
district court judge to make a de novo determination of contested
credibility assessments without personally hearing the live testimony,
95
violated . . . Art. III of the United States Constitution.” The Supreme Court disagreed and, instead, concluded that due process
rights claimed by the defendant “[we]re adequately protected by
§ 636(b)(1)” because “the statute grants the judge the broad discre96
tion to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed findings.”
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern, most federal circuits also upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Federal
Magistrates Act which authorize the magistrate judge to preside over
97
and enter final judgment in jury and non-jury trials. For example,
in Wharton-Thomas v. United States, the Third Circuit found that the
separation of powers concept “is not violated in the magistrate system” because “[t]he only conceivable danger of a threat to the inde93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 2609 (majority opinion)
447 U.S. 667, 667, 680–81 (1980).
Id. at 677.
Id. at 680.
See, e.g., Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir.
1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984);
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir.
1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929–30 (3d
Cir. 1983); but see Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d
1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn, 718 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that section
636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act allowing magistrate judges, with consent of parties
to litigation, to conduct civil trials and enter final judgments violated the Constitution).
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pendence of the magistrate comes from within, rather than without
98
the judicial department.” Similarly, in Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc. the Seventh Circuit upheld the Federal Magistrates Act
based on its determination that magistrate judges functioned as adjuncts of the district court by “provid[ing] quicker and less costly alternative to the usually more delayed adjudication in a district
99
court.”
Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp.
was the first case following Stern that raised the question of the au100
thority of the magistrate judge to enter a final judgment.
In Technical Automation, which involved the appeal of summary judgment
awarded to the insured in a contract dispute case, the Fifth Circuit
sua sponte addressed the jurisdictional question of “whether, in the
light of Stern v. Marshall, the magistrate judge had authority under
Article III of the Constitution to try and enter judgment in the state
101
law counterclaim in this case.”
The parties in the case consented
under section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act to having the
magistrate judge determine and enter final judgment as to “Technical Automation’s breach of contract, duty to defend, and duty to
indemnify claims; . . . third party claims; and Liberty’s reformation
102
counterclaim.”
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s concern
that “even the slightest ‘chipping’ away of Article III can lead to ‘ille103
gitimate and unconstitutional practice.’” It also recognized the sim104
ilarities between bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges.
Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that section 636(c) does not violate
105
Two key factors influenced the
Article III of the Constitution.
court’s decision: (1) the Supreme Court had not overruled the Fifth
Circuit’s precedent in Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., which upheld the authority
of magistrate judges to enter a final judgment on claims involving
consenting parties; and (2) Stern had limited application to the context of bankruptcy courts and, as such, did not affect the magistrate
106
judges’ authority in the Fifth Circuit.

98
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Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
Geras, 742 F.2d at 1041.
673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
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Even if the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Stern is in line
with those of the Supreme Court, it still does not explain why magis107
trate judges should be treated differently from bankruptcy judges.
Functionally, bankruptcy and magistrate judges perform essentially
the same tasks and are permitted to exercise the same degree of authority under the Federal Magistrates Act and the Bankruptcy Act, respectively. Thus, it does not make sense doctrinally and practically to
separate bankruptcy courts and to treat them differently from all other non-Article III tribunals. Although the Supreme Court as well as a
number of the lower courts have attempted to distinguish administrative agencies and magistrate judges, among others, from bankruptcy
courts, they have not provided clear justification for such distinc108
tion.
This uncertainty in the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisprudence raises serious concerns because it calls into question the constitutionality of non-Article III tribunals.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall appears to revert back to a
more restrictive Article III analysis through its application of Northern
Pipeline’s public rights/private rights dichotomy. In doing so, the
Court creates a troubling doctrinal inconsistency through its adoption of both a formalist and a functionalist approach. This inconsistency raises serious concerns about the status of non-Article III adjudicatory bodies, and particularly magistrate judges who are
functional equivalents of bankruptcy judges—carrying out similar
tasks and possessing similar degrees of authority.
While Chief Justice Roberts does attempt, albeit unsuccessfully, to
mitigate the effects of the doctrinal inconsistency by purporting to
limit the Court’s decision in Stern to bankruptcy courts, the inconsistency still remains. Even though the Supreme Court tries to distinguish bankruptcy courts from administrative agencies and other legislative bodies, it does not justify why the distinction is valid or how
lower courts should go about applying Stern’s framework in other
contexts. Consequently, the Supreme Court in the coming terms
107

108

See Joshua C. Gerber, Note, “Why the Fuss?”: Stern v. Marshall and the Supreme Court’s Understanding of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 989, 990 (2013) (arguing
“the Supreme Court applies a separate, stricter, and more formal interpretation of Article
III when scrutinizing the boundaries of bankruptcy court jurisdiction than it applies when
performing the same kind of analysis with respect to other non-Article III adjudicative
bodies”).
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (recognizing administrative agencies as adjuncts of the district court).
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should address the doctrinal inconsistencies in Stern and better clarify
the status of magistrate judges, as well as those of other non-Article
III tribunals, and their ability to enter final judgments on state law
counterclaims.

